Radicalization and Deradicalization: Processes and Contexts

In this manuscript, we introduce a theoretical model of climate radicalization that integrates social psychological theories of perceived unfairness with historical insights on radicalization to contribute to the knowledge of individuals’ processes of radicalization and non-radicalization in relation to climate change. We define climate radicalization as a process of growing willingness to pursue and/or support radical changes in society that are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the status quo or democratic legal order to reach climate goals. We describe how perceptions of unfairness can play a pivotal role in processes of climate change related radicalization. Without taking any position or judgment regarding climate concerns and associated actions, we suggest that although these behaviors drive many people to participate in peaceful climate protest, they may also lead others to radicalize into breaking the law to achieve their climate goals, possibly in violent ways. This process of climate radicalization, we argue, can be driven by people perceiving certain situations to be blatantly unfair. Specifically, we discuss how radical attitudes and behaviors can be products of perceived unfairness stemming from the past, the future, the immediate social environments of perceivers, as well as those that are spatially distant from them. We further argue that because radicalization processes are shaped by an interaction between individuals and movements, on the one hand, and societal actors and developments, on the other, they tend to develop in non-linear and dynamic ways. We therefore propose that climate radicalization is a (1) dynamic, contingent, and non-linear process, often of an escalating (and sometimes de-escalating) kind, (2) that develops over time, (3) through various interactions between individuals and their contexts, and (4) in which people and groups move back and forth from peaceful protest, through disobedient and unlawful methods, to violent actions. Implications, strengths, and limitations of our model are discussed.

Background: Public health-inspired programs for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) have developed internationally in a relatively short period of time. Research into these programs is scarce. There is a need for information that helps drive public health interventions.

Objectives: To present data on the occurrence of psychiatric disorders, self-sufficiency problems and adverse childhood experiences (ACE) in a population suspected of violent extremism.

Methods: A cross-sectional study, with data from screening reports for 34 adult subjects included in a multi-agency case-based approach on violent extremism in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Subjects were screened in the period between December 2015 to May 2021. Screening reports, which included the Screener for Intelligence and Learning Disabilities (SCIL) and the Dutch version of the Self-sufficiency Matrix (SSM-D), were used to gather information on the main outcome measures.

Results: Major psychiatric disease categories were found to be mood and anxiety disorders and mild intellectual disability (each 29.4%), substance related disorders (35.3%), personality disorders (41.2%), and psychotic disorders (14.7%). Complex self-sufficiency problems, measured by the number of people who had self-sufficiency problems in 4+ domains and the number of people who had similar self-sufficiency problems as homeless people in Amsterdam, were found in 35.3 and 32.4% of the client sample. The most prevalent ACE were emotional neglect (47.1%), household mental illness (44.1%), and loss of a parent (38.2%), 35.3% had been exposed to 4+ ACE. An association was found between N_ACE and self-sufficiency problems on two domains, namely “Mental Health” (rho = 0.51, p = 0.002) and “Law and order” (rho = 0.42, p = 0.013).

Conclusions: An accumulation of social and psychiatric problems in people suspected of violent extremism underlines the importance of professionals in health and social care being actively involved in developing CVE approaches.

Recent research has identified three promising candidates for predicting extreme behavior: sacred values, moral convictions, and identity fusion. Each construct is thought to motivate extreme behavior in unique ways: Sacred values trigger extreme actions when people are asked to compromise cause-related values for personal gain; moral convictions trigger extreme actions when a cause is aligned with one’s moral compass; and identity fusion triggers extreme actions when a cause is inextricably associated (“fused”) with the personal self. In six studies, we asked which of the three constructs (either alone or in combination) was most predictive of sacrifice for a cause. We measured all three constructs with respect to either of two causes: gun rights (Studies 1–3) or abortion rights (4–6). The outcome measure was endorsement of fighting and dying for the cause. Although all three constructs were significant predictors of the outcome measure when considered separately, identity fusion consistently emerged as the strongest predictor of endorsement of self-sacrifice when all three were considered simultaneously. This pattern occurred regardless of the target cause (gun or abortion rights), the participant’s position on the cause (i.e., pro-gun or anti-gun, pro-choice, or pro-life), or nationality (American vs. Spanish). Also, there was no evidence that the predictors interacted to predict the outcome measure. Finally, a manipulation that threatened the validity of the personal self strengthened the relationship between endorsement of self-sacrifice and both (a) identity fusion and (b) moral convictions. The latter finding suggests that threats to the validity of one’s self-views may amplify the extreme behaviors of true believers.