About this Research Topic
Across a wide range of disciplines (including social psychology, economics, climate impact research, biology and sociology), the hypothesis has been put forward that common threats foster group cooperation. A common threat can be posed by nature or a common adversary, and is often conceptualized as reducing the fitness or welfare of individuals, or making their (future) fitness or welfare more uncertain. Insight into the validity and generality of the hypothesis that common threats foster cooperation is important, as it would help us to understand and predict under which circumstances and why humans cooperate when facing common threats such as climate change, terrorism, or health hazards. Open questions that remain, concern the circumstances under which the hypothesis applies, and the underlying factors explaining why a common threat would foster cooperation.
Looking at the circumstances under which the hypothesis applies, does it make a difference whether the common threat is posed by nature, by an individual, or by a group? When the common threat is posed by nature, does it matter whether it consists of a continued harsh environment, or of a catastrophic tipping point in the environment? What role does uncertainty about the common threat play? How do common threats promote cooperation in relation to other, well-studied mechanisms, such as kin or group selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, social norms, and network effects? What role does the interdependence structure between group members play in their response to common threats? How resilient is cooperation when common threats are faced? Are there circumstances under which an opposite effect applies, where common threats discourage cooperation? Looking at the underlying factors, does the validity of the hypothesis rely on a common threat that equally applies to all members of a group or only to some members? Further, are cooperation rates in response to a common threat mediated and explained by a ‘common-fate mindset’? Does the presence of a real or perceived common threat change the social or competitive preferences of individuals?
Contributors to the Research Topic are encouraged to apply insights from biology, climate-impact research, social psychology, environmental psychology, economics, sociology and/or anthropology to answer the following questions:
1) under what circumstances do harsh environments have the effect of fostering cooperation among individuals?;
2) what are the underlying factors explaining such an effect (proximate and/or ultimate causes)?
The following types of contributions may be submitted:
• Empirical analyses of the data of existing or of new laboratory or field experiments;
• Static or dynamic analytical theoretical models, typically applying (evolutionary) game theory;
• Contributions in behavioral game theory, importing psychological realism into game theory;
• Agent-based models dealing with real-world inspired models that are too complex to treat analytically;
• Reviews or critical discussions on the literature of the specified topic.
Looking at the circumstances under which the hypothesis applies, does it make a difference whether the common threat is posed by nature, by an individual, or by a group? When the common threat is posed by nature, does it matter whether it consists of a continued harsh environment, or of a catastrophic tipping point in the environment? What role does uncertainty about the common threat play? How do common threats promote cooperation in relation to other, well-studied mechanisms, such as kin or group selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, social norms, and network effects? What role does the interdependence structure between group members play in their response to common threats? How resilient is cooperation when common threats are faced? Are there circumstances under which an opposite effect applies, where common threats discourage cooperation? Looking at the underlying factors, does the validity of the hypothesis rely on a common threat that equally applies to all members of a group or only to some members? Further, are cooperation rates in response to a common threat mediated and explained by a ‘common-fate mindset’? Does the presence of a real or perceived common threat change the social or competitive preferences of individuals?
Contributors to the Research Topic are encouraged to apply insights from biology, climate-impact research, social psychology, environmental psychology, economics, sociology and/or anthropology to answer the following questions:
1) under what circumstances do harsh environments have the effect of fostering cooperation among individuals?;
2) what are the underlying factors explaining such an effect (proximate and/or ultimate causes)?
The following types of contributions may be submitted:
• Empirical analyses of the data of existing or of new laboratory or field experiments;
• Static or dynamic analytical theoretical models, typically applying (evolutionary) game theory;
• Contributions in behavioral game theory, importing psychological realism into game theory;
• Agent-based models dealing with real-world inspired models that are too complex to treat analytically;
• Reviews or critical discussions on the literature of the specified topic.
Important Note: All contributions to this Research Topic must be within the scope of the section and journal to which they are submitted, as defined in their mission statements. Frontiers reserves the right to guide an out-of-scope manuscript to a more suitable section or journal at any stage of peer review.
