About this Research Topic
In the 80s, Macphail put forth evidence in support of the null hypothesis for differences in intelligence across nonhuman species, stating that there are "no differences, either qualitative or quantitative, among vertebrates."
He further claimed that association formation dominates intelligent behaviour, that any differences in intelligence between species could be accounted for by the differential effects of contextual variables, that learning mechanisms are of general applicability and did not evolve as species-specific specializations, and that human intelligence differs from that of other animals in that they possess a species-specific language device.
Macphail went on to say that "support for the hypothesis will grow as the number of failures to disprove it increase."
The past 35 years have witnessed an explosion in the number of studies examining the cognitive abilities of a wide variety of animals. From concept formation in bees to fast mapping in dogs, from numerical competence in monkeys to episodic memory in birds, we think it is time to re-evaluate Macphail's claim.
Are there any differences in intelligence/cognition across vertebrate species?
Can associative processes account for all nonhuman intelligence?
Can any observed differences still be explained away by the operation of contextual variables (e.g., appropriateness of the context, and sensory, response, and motivational differences)?
Is all behavior governed by general learning mechanisms that cut across all species?
Aside from the role of language, is human intelligence really different from that of nonhuman intelligence?
In this Research Topic, we welcome authors to contribute a paper that explores the central theme put forth by Macphail, whether there are any differences in intelligence/cognition across species, or whether the null hypothesis still holds true.
He further claimed that association formation dominates intelligent behaviour, that any differences in intelligence between species could be accounted for by the differential effects of contextual variables, that learning mechanisms are of general applicability and did not evolve as species-specific specializations, and that human intelligence differs from that of other animals in that they possess a species-specific language device.
Macphail went on to say that "support for the hypothesis will grow as the number of failures to disprove it increase."
The past 35 years have witnessed an explosion in the number of studies examining the cognitive abilities of a wide variety of animals. From concept formation in bees to fast mapping in dogs, from numerical competence in monkeys to episodic memory in birds, we think it is time to re-evaluate Macphail's claim.
Are there any differences in intelligence/cognition across vertebrate species?
Can associative processes account for all nonhuman intelligence?
Can any observed differences still be explained away by the operation of contextual variables (e.g., appropriateness of the context, and sensory, response, and motivational differences)?
Is all behavior governed by general learning mechanisms that cut across all species?
Aside from the role of language, is human intelligence really different from that of nonhuman intelligence?
In this Research Topic, we welcome authors to contribute a paper that explores the central theme put forth by Macphail, whether there are any differences in intelligence/cognition across species, or whether the null hypothesis still holds true.
Keywords: Null Hypothesis, Intelligence, Species, Comparative Cognition, Associative Learning, Contextual Variables
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