Government-Market Synergy in China's Agricultural Low-Carbon Transformation: Policy Adaptation to Regional Divides Unraveling Government Regulation and Market Mechanisms in China's Agricultural Low-Carbon Transition -A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regional Heterogeneity

Feng Liao¹Yangyang Zheng¹Xiaofeng Wang^2*Lihui Xiong¹

• ¹Wenzhou University, Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, China
• ²Wenzhou Vocational College of Science and Technology, Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, China

Overcoming the development dilemma of traditional agriculture and pPromoting its agricultural low-carbon transformation are essential for achieving the "dual carbon" targets and advancing the high-quality development of Chinese agriculture. This paper employsstudy employed evolutionary game theory to construct a tripartite model involving local governments, agricultural enterprises, and consumers. It simulates stimulated and analyzes their decision-making processes and explores explored the mechanisms of the government regulation and market adjustment.Furthermore, taking into account regional technology technological differences, this paper study examines examined the differentiated incentive effects of government regulation and market adjustmenttwo mechanisms, and develops developed a comprehensive analytical framework for agricultural low-carbon transformation of agricultureagricultural low-carbon transformation . The main conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) The model reveals revealed three potential evolutionary evolutionarily stable states, with the system evolving towardstoward the optimal equilibrium of (1,1,1) under specific constraint conditions. (2) To achieve the system's Pareto optimality, the optimal intervals for subsidy coefficients and carbon emission penalties were (0.2, 0.25) and (1.5, 1.75), respectively. The optimal intervals for publicity coefficients and low-carbon consumption preferences were (0.3, 0.35) and (0.65, 0.7), respectively.Optimal ranges exist for parameters related to government regulation and market adjustment. Specifically, when the subsidy coefficient, promotion coefficient, and carbon emission penalty fall within the ranges of (0.2,0.25), (0.3,0.35), and (1.5,1.75), respectively, and the low-carbon consumption preference is within the range of (0.65,0.7), the system achieves Pareto optimality. (3) Considering regional technology technological differences, for the sustainable development of low-carbon agriculture, western regions with lower levels of low-carbon technology should prioritize government regulation, supplemented by market adjustment. Central regions should strike a balance between government regulation and market adjustmenttwo methods, while whereas eastern regions with more advanced low-carbon technologies should focus on market adjustment, with government regulation as a supplement. This study enhances the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the government and market, holding both theoretical and practical significance for advancing agricultural lowcarbon transformation.