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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Sustain. Food Syst.
Sec. Agricultural and Food Economics
Volume 8 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fsufs.2024.1439105
This article is part of the Research Topic Food Waste Reduction During Consumption and Disposal View all 3 articles

Promotion Strategies of Food Delivery O2O Supply Chain with Anti-Food Waste Regulation

Provisionally accepted
  • 1 School of management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China
  • 2 College of Modern Logistics, Guangzhou Panyu Polytechnic, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    This paper connects food waste with food delivery service and aims to explore the impacts of the anti-food waste regulation on food waste generation and the selection of promotion strategy in an Online-to-Offline (O2O) supply chain. Using a game-theoretical approach, we focus on three prominent promotion strategies-a no-promotion strategy (N strategy), a price discount strategy (D strategy), or a volume-based price discount strategy (S strategy). Our research results indicate that the restaurant's choice of promotion strategy is almost independent of the intensity of anti-food waste penalties. However, the optimal strategy of the platform and the amount of waste are influenced by it. Under certain conditions, restaurants and platforms were able to achieve a win-win situation through promotion strategies. In the case of the relaxation of anti-food waste regulations, both restaurants and platforms tend to adopt the D strategy. In contrast, when penalties are stronger, platforms may be forced to accept D or S strategy because of the proactive behaviors of restaurants, even if they would prefer not to adopt promotion strategies. Overall, the government should consider bringing restaurants under regulation to protect platform revenue and effectively reduce food waste.

    Keywords: Food waste, O2O supply chain, Food delivery, promotion strategies, anti-food waste regulation

    Received: 27 May 2024; Accepted: 09 Sep 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 Xu, Tang and Xu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Guangye Xu, School of management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.