The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Comput. Sci.
Sec. Computer Security
Volume 6 - 2024 |
doi: 10.3389/fcomp.2024.1504548
An Evaluation of Methods for Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in the Smart Grid
Provisionally accepted- IMC University of Applied Sciences Krems, Krems an der Donau, Austria
Power Systems (EPSs) there is an increased potential and impact of cyber-attacks. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) enable very fine granular measurements to allow situational awareness in smart grids. But false data injection attacks, which manipulate measurement data, can trigger wrong decisions and cause critical situations in the grid.In this paper, we analyze four different false data injection attacks on PMU measurements and investigate different methods to detect such attacks. Classical bad data detection methods are not sufficient to detect stealthy attacks. We therefore propose to complement detection by additional methods. For this we analyze the detection performance of four very different detection methods: a) the classical adaptive bad data detection approach based on the residuals of linear Kalman Filters, b) a simple threshold based on the Median Average Deviation (MAD), c) a distribution-based approach using the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) and d) the cumulative sum (CUSUM) as a representative of a change point detection method. We show that each method has advantages and disadvantages and that multiple methods should be used together to prevent that attackers can circumvent detection.
Keywords: smart grid security, anomaly detection, PMU, Phasor measurements, state estimation
Received: 01 Oct 2024; Accepted: 02 Dec 2024.
Copyright: © 2024 Paudel. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence:
Sarita Paudel, IMC University of Applied Sciences Krems, Krems an der Donau, Austria
Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.