CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS article

Front. Psychol.

Sec. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Volume 16 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1569237

This article is part of the Research TopicDeepening Consciousness: What Phenomenology, Yogic, and Buddhist Meditation Can Contribute From a Psychological PerspectiveView all articles

Stoicism, Mindfulness, and the Brain: The Empirical Foundations of Second-Order Desires

Provisionally accepted
  • 1Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health (IGPP), Freiburg, Germany
  • 2San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, United States
  • 3Roma Tre University, Rome, Lazio, Italy

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

Building on the Stoic notion of self-regulation, we explore philosophical conceptualizations in relation to empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. We challenge the mainstream account that dismisses the possibility of free will based on contemporary scientific findings. Instead, we argue that these findings actually support and refine the Stoic view of free will, particularly in terms of diachronic self-regulation through second-order willed actions over time. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experimentswhich are often cited to refute free will-we contend that such evidence undermines the notion that we are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Rather, we possess the capacity to regulate our actions proactively by cultivating and exercising deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom, in this sense, arises from a meta-cognitive ability or hierarchical, secondorder will that can causally influence or override first-order desires or impulsive habits. In essence, our choices are not entirely predetermined by our upbringing or external circumstances; they emerge from our capacity to reflect upon and respond to those influences. Through this process, the self becomes a self-determined free agent.

Keywords: free will, Self-regulation, Stoicism, Libet clock procedure, voluntary action, Diachronic agency

Received: 31 Jan 2025; Accepted: 14 Apr 2025.

Copyright: © 2025 Wittmann, Montemayor and Dorato. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence: Marc Wittmann, Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health (IGPP), Freiburg, 79098, Germany

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