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HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY article

Front. Psychol.
Sec. Consciousness Research
Volume 15 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423
This article is part of the Research Topic Animal Consciousness: Exploring Theoretical, Methodological and Ethical Issues View all 6 articles

The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective

Provisionally accepted
  • University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    The functions of consciousness, viewed from an evolutionary standpoint, can be categorized as being either general or particular. There are two general functions, meaning those that do not depend on the particulars of how consciousness influences behavior or how and why it first evolved: of (1) expanding the behavioral repertoire of the individual through the gradual accumulation of neurocircuitry innovations incorporating consciousness that would not exist without it, and (2) reducing the timescale over which preprogrammed behaviors can be altered, from evolutionary time, across generations, to real time. But neither answers Velmans' question, of why consciousness is adaptive in a proximate sense, and hence why it would have evolved, which depends on identifying the particular function it first performed. Memory arguably plays a role here, as a strong case can be made that consciousness first evolved to make motivational control more responsive, though memory, to the past life experiences of the individual. A control mechanism of this kind could, for example, have evolved to consciously inhibit appetitive behaviors, whether consciously instigated or not, that would otherwise expose the individual to harm. There is then the question of whether, for amniote vertebrates, a role in memory formation and access would have led directly to a wider role for consciousness in the way the brain operates, or if some other explanation is required. Velman's question might then have two answers, the second having more to do with the advantages of global oversight for the control of behavior, as in a global workspace, or for conferring meaning on sensory experience in a way that non-conscious neural processes cannot. Meaning in this context refers specifically to the way valence is embodied in the genomic instructions for assembling the neurocircuitry responsible for phenomenal contents, so it constitutes an embodied form of species memory, and a way of thinking about the adaptive utility of consciousness that is less concerned with real-time mechanistic events than with information storage on an evolutionary timescale.

    Keywords: memory theories of consciousness, agency, phenomenal experience, qualia, species memory

    Received: 09 Sep 2024; Accepted: 12 Nov 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 Lacalli. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Thurston Lacalli, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada

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