Skip to main content

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Psychol.
Sec. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Volume 15 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1389575
This article is part of the Research Topic Varieties of Agency: Exploring New Avenues View all 4 articles

The World as Witty Agent -Donna Haraway on the Object of Knowledge

Provisionally accepted
  • Technical University Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    In her essay “Situated Knowledges”, the biologist and philosopher of science Donna Haraway tackles the question of scientific objectivity from a feminist perspective and opts for a ‘re-vision’ of science that overcomes the traditional dualisms of epistemic subject and object as well as of nature and culture (science). Beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism, Haraway understands ‘nature’ or ‘world’ neither as a passive resource nor as a human product of imagination. Rather, she argues, the world is to be understood as a ‘witty agent’ that has its own efficacy and historicity in the production of knowledge. Instead of epistemic reification, possession and appropriation of ‘nature’, knowledge production should be understood as a conversation between material-semiotic actors, human and non-human, from which none of the actors leaves as they entered. In this paper, I want to explore what it means to conceive of nature or world in knowledge processes as a “witty agent” and how exactly one is to imagine this form of non-human agency. To this end, I will first explain Haraway’s re-vision of “nature” beyond scientific realism and radical social constructivism (sect. 2). From this, I will discuss her underlying conception of agency (sect. 3). This involves first, a reconception of the traditional relation between epistemic subject and object as dynamic and situational relation (sect. 3.1). Second, Haraway characterizes the world’s epistemic agency in more positive terms by using the ‘trickster’ figure as it appears in Southwest Native American representations in the form of a Coyote (sect. 3.2). Finally, I will come back to Haraway’s initial question of an objective scientific approach to the world, which for her consists in a power-charged social relation of conversations with the world. I will conclude with a critical reflection of what Haraway’s conception of the world as an agent means for scientific practice and its engagement with objects of knowledge.

    Keywords: scientific objectivity, Feminist philosophy of science, Donna Haraway, epistemic agency, situated knowledge

    Received: 21 Feb 2024; Accepted: 27 Jun 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 Trächtler. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Jasmin Trächtler, Technical University Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.