Lack of insight, i.e., unawareness of one’s mental illness, is frequently encountered in psychiatric conditions. Insight is the capacity to recognize (psychical insight) and accept one’s mental illness (emotional insight). Insight growth necessitates developing an objective perspective on one’s subjective pathological experiences. Therefore, insight has been posited to require undamaged self-reflexion and cognitive perspective-taking capacities. These enable patients to look objectively at themselves from the imagined perspective of someone else. Preserved theory-of-mind performances have been reported to positively impact insight in psychosis. However, some patients with schizophrenia or obsessive-compulsive disorders, although recognizing their mental disease, are still not convinced of this and do not accept it. Hence, perspective-taking explains psychical insight (recognition) but not emotional insight (acceptance). Here, we propose a new conceptual model. We hypothesize that insight growth relies upon the association of intact self-reflexion and empathic capacities. Empathy (feeling into someone else) integrates heterocentered visuo-spatial perspective (feeling into), embodiment, affective (feeling into) and cognitive processes, leading to internally experience the other’s thought. We posit that this subjective experience enables to better understand the other’s thought about oneself and to affectively adhere to this. We propose that the process of objectification, resulting from empathic heterocentered, embodiment, and cognitive processes, generates an objective viewpoint on oneself. It enables to recognize one’s mental illness and positively impacts psychical insight. The process of subjectification, resulting from empathic affective processes, enables to accept one’s illness and positively impacts emotional insight. That is, affectively experiencing the thought of another person about oneself reinforces the adhesion of the emotional system to the objective recognition of the disease. Applying our model to different psychiatric disorders, we predict that the negative effect of impaired self-reflexion and empathic capacities on insight is a transnosographic state and that endophenotypical differences modulate this common state, determining a psychiatric disease as specific.
Empathy in aging is a key capacity because it affects the quality of older adults’ relationships and reduced levels are associated with greater loneliness. Many older adults also find themselves in the role of a caregiver to a loved one, and thus empathy is critical for the success of the caregiver–patient relationship. Furthermore, older adults are motivated to make strong emotional connections with others, as highlighted in the socioemotional selectivity theory. Consequently, reductions in empathy could negatively impact their goals. However, there is growing evidence that older adults experience at least some changes in empathy, depending on the domain. Specifically, the state of the research is that older adults have lower cognitive empathy (i.e., the ability to understand others’ thoughts and feelings) than younger adults, but similar and in some cases even higher levels of emotional empathy (i.e., the ability to feel emotions that are similar to others’ or feel compassion for them). A small number of studies have examined the neural mechanisms for age-related differences in empathy and have found reduced activity in a key brain area associated with cognitive empathy. However, more research is needed to further characterize how brain changes impact empathy with age, especially in the emotional domain of empathy. In this review, we discuss the current state of the research on age-related differences in the psychological and neural bases of empathy, with a specific comparison of the cognitive versus emotional components. Finally, we highlight new directions for research in this area and examine the implications of age-related differences in empathy for older adults.
Previous research has demonstrated that patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) are more sensitive to negative emotions and often show poor cognitive empathy, yet preserved or even superior emotional empathy. However, little is known about the neural correlates of empathy. Here, we examined empathy for pain in 20 patients with BPD and 19 healthy controls (HC) in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, which comprised an empathy for pain paradigm showing facial emotions prior to hands exposed to painful stimuli. We found a selectively enhanced activation of the right supramarginal gyrus for painful hand pictures following painful facial expressions in BPD patients, and lower activation to nonpainful pictures following angry expressions. Patients with BPD showed less activation in the left supramarginal gyrus when viewing angry facial expressions compared to HC, independent of the pain condition. Moreover, we found differential activation of the left anterior insula, depending on the preceding facial expression exclusively in patients. The findings suggest that empathy for pain becomes selectively enhanced, depending on the emotional context information in patients with BPD. Another preliminary finding was an attenuated response to emotions in patients receiving psychotropic medication compared to unmedicated patients. These effects need to be replicated in larger samples. Together, increased activation during the observation of painful facial expressions seems to reflect emotional hypersensitivity in BPD.
Humans have the capacity to share others' emotions, be they positive or negative. Elicited by the observed or imagined emotion of another person, an observer develops a similar emotional state herself. This capacity, empathy, is one of the pillars of social understanding and interaction as it creates a representation of another's inner, mental state. Empathy needs to be dissociated from other social emotions and, crucially, also from cognitive mechanisms of understanding others, the ability to take others' perspective. Here, we describe the conceptual distinctions of these constructs and review behavioral and neural evidence that dissociates them. The main focus of the present review lies on the intraindividual changes in empathy and perspective-taking across the lifespan and on interindividual differences on subclinical and clinical levels. The data show that empathy and perspective-taking recruit distinct neural circuits and can be discerned already during early and throughout adult development. Both capacities also vary substantially between situations and people. Differences can be systematically related to situational characteristics as well as personality traits and mental disorders. The clear distinction of affect sharing from other social emotions like compassion and from cognitive perspective-taking, argues for a clear-cut terminology to describe these constructs. In our view, this speaks against using empathy as an umbrella term encompassing all affective and cognitive routes to understanding others. Unifying the way we speak about these phenomena will help to further research on their underlying mechanisms, psychopathological alterations, and plasticity in training and therapy.
During the last few years, burnout has gained more and more attention for its strong connection with job performance, absenteeism, and presenteeism. It is a psychological phenomenon that depends on occupation, also presenting differences between sexes. However, to properly compare the burnout levels of different groups, a psychometric instrument with adequate validity evidence should be selected (i.e., with measurement invariance). This paper aims to describe the psychometric properties of the Oldenburg Burnout Inventory (OLBI) version adapted for workers from Brazil and Portugal, and to compare burnout across countries and sexes. OLBI's validity evidence based on the internal structure (dimensionality, reliability, and measurement invariance), and validity evidence based on relationships with other variables (work engagement) are described. Additionally, it aims presents a revision of different OLBI's versions—since this is the first version of the instrument developed simultaneously for both countries—it is an important instrument for understanding burnout between sexes in organizations. Data were used from 1,172 employees across two independent samples, one from Portugal and the other from Brazil, 65 percent being female. Regarding the OLBI internal structure, a reduced version (15 items) was obtained. The high correlation between disengagement and exhaustion, suggested the existence of a second-order latent factor, burnout, which presented measurement invariance for country and sex. Confirmatory factor analysis of the Portuguese OLBI version presented good goodness-of-fit indices and good internal consistency values. No statistically significant differences were found in burnout between sexes or countries. OLBI also showed psychometric properties that make it a promising and freely available instrument to measure and compare burnout levels of Portuguese and Brazilian employees.
Background: Recent models of eating disorders (EDs) have proposed social and emotional difficulties as key factors in the development and maintenance of the illness. While a number of studies have demonstrated difficulties in theory of mind and emotion recognition, little is known about empathic abilities in those with EDs. Further, few studies have examined the cognitive-affective empathy profile in EDs. The aim of this systematic review and meta-analysis was to provide a synthesis of empathy studies in EDs, and examine whether those with EDs differ from healthy controls (HC) on self-reported total, cognitive, and affective empathy.
Methods: Electronic databases were systematically searched for studies using self-report measures of empathy in ED populations. In total, 17 studies were identified, 14 of which could be included in the total empathy meta-analysis. Eight of the 14 studies were included in the cognitive and affective empathy meta-analyses.
Results: Meta-analyses showed that while total empathy and affective empathy scores did not differ between those with anorexia nervosa (AN) and HC, those with AN had significantly lower cognitive empathy scores compared to HCs (small effect size). Meta-analyses of Interpersonal Reactivity Index sub-scores revealed that AN had significantly lower Fantasy scores than HC (small effect size), indicating that those with AN have more difficulty in identifying themselves with fictional characters. Only 3 studies examined empathy in those with bulimia nervosa (BN) or binge eating disorder (BED).
Conclusions: The lowered cognitive empathy and intact affective empathy profile found in AN is similar to that found in other psychiatric and neurodevelopmental conditions, such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD). These findings add to the literature characterizing the socio-emotional phenotype in EDs. Future research should examine the influence of comorbid psychopathology on empathy in EDs.