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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Sustain. Energy Policy
Sec. Economics and Business of Sustainable Energy
Volume 3 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fsuep.2024.1456264
This article is part of the Research Topic Financial Development, Institutions, and Markets in the Era of Climate Change View all articles

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Government and Enterprises in Carbon Emission Reduction under Multi-Market Coordinated Trading

Provisionally accepted
guo wei guo wei 1meng tao meng tao 2piao z. yong piao z. yong 3chen y. an chen y. an 1liu hao liu hao 1xu d. ming xu d. ming 1meng f. yan meng f. yan 1wang xin wang xin 4han j. ping han j. ping 4yan jing yan jing 4yang x. long yang x. long 4li j. qi li j. qi 4*Zeqi Ge Zeqi Ge 4
  • 1 State Grid Baicheng Power Supply Company, baicheng, China
  • 2 Research Institute of Electric Power Science, State Grid Jilin Electric Power Company Limited,, changchun, China
  • 3 Jilin Electric Power Trading Center Co., LTD., changchun, China
  • 4 Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    The three primary markets for carbon emission reduction trading are green certificate, green power, and carbon emission right markets. This paper suggests utilizing game theory to analyze the behaviors of government and enterprises in multi-market synergistic trading. The main participants in the game are the government, electricity consuming enterprises, traditional power generators, and new energy power generators. The game model will be simulated using system dynamics, and recommendations and measures will be proposed.The findings indicate that: (1) the government's ultimate strategy is to "act" when the losses resulting from government inaction exceed the gains from government action. (2) Behavioural evolution is consistent when market participants refrain from adjusting their cost inputs in response to fluctuations in market prices. (3) The market price is not as high as possible, but too high a price inhibits emission reduction. The behavioral evolution of carbon emission reduction in multiple markets is revealed in this study, which is of great importance in the promotion of carbon emission reduction.

    Keywords: Carbon reduction, evolutionary game, system dynamics, Multi-market collaborative trading, Combination of government and enterprise

    Received: 28 Jun 2024; Accepted: 20 Sep 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 wei, tao, yong, an, hao, ming, yan, xin, ping, jing, long, qi and Ge. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: li j. qi, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.