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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Public Health

Sec. Health Economics

Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2025.1542858

Comparative study on government subsidy models for competitive drug supply chains under centralized procurement policy

Provisionally accepted
  • Qingdao University, Qingdao, Shandong Province, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    As the generic drug market tends to be saturated, the structural transformation of generic drug companies is imminent, while the high investment and high-risk attributes of innovative drug research and development aggravate the transformation difficulties. Against this backdrop, the government attempts to strike a balance between promoting the development of both generic and innovative drugs, improving drug quality, and reducing healthcare costs through centralized drug procurement policies and subsidies for drug companies and healthcare institutions. To this end, this study considers the effect of health insurance reimbursement and market competition ferocity, and constructs a differential game model of a secondary drug supply chain comprising two competing drug companies and a single healthcare institution. In addition, this study comparatively analyzes the optimal equilibrium strategies and supply chain profit levels of drug research and development investment and healthcare service efforts under four government subsidy modes, further discussing them along with arithmetic examples. It is found that the government’s subsidy behavior markedly influenced drug companies’ investment in drug research and development and healthcare institution’ service cost investment. Besides, different incentives for supply chain members’ decision-making and profits were noted in different markets with different competition intensities. In the low-intensity competition market, the government’s subsidies to innovative drug companies generate much higher social welfare than other modes. In the high-intensity competition market, the government subsidized healthcare institution can minimize the mutually exclusive effects of subsidies on the development of innovative and generic drug companies, and eventually drive the reform and development of the entire drug industry.

    Keywords: Centralized procurement, government subsidies, Differential game, Drug supply chain, Innovative drug

    Received: 10 Dec 2024; Accepted: 24 Feb 2025.

    Copyright: © 2025 Wen, Wei and Liu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Yan Wei, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, Shandong Province, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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