Currently in China, there is a lack of well-defined and viable incentive mechanisms at the governmental and hospital levels to support the development of young medical talents, thereby hindering their growth Existing studies primarily investigate the current state and trajectory of incentives, yet they inadequately address the distinctive characteristics of various stakeholders involved in medical talent incentive processes, particularly the lack of research on incentive mechanisms with Chinese attributes.
This study adopts evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of replication and the strategies for achieving evolutionary stability in the comprehensive development of young medical talents, considering both scenarios with and without supportive policies.
In the absence of any supportive policy measures, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) point is
(1) Government incentives play a crucial role in motivating young medical talents to seek comprehensive development. (2) The level of government incentive support for young medical talents should exceed the cost increment of individual efforts. Additionally, the policy support provided by the government to medical institutions should surpass the incentive support offered by these institutions to young medical talents. This will enhance the motivation and encouragement efforts of medical institutions in actively promoting comprehensive development among young medical talents. (3) With the backing of certain government incentive policies, medical institutions implementing incentive measures and young medical talents actively seeking comprehensive development will establish a virtuous cycle of mutual promotion.