AUTHOR=Hannikainen Ivar R. , Machery Edouard , Rose David , Stich Stephen , Olivola Christopher Y. , Sousa Paulo , Cova Florian , Buchtel Emma E. , Alai Mario , Angelucci Adriano , Berniûnas Renatas , Chatterjee Amita , Cheon Hyundeuk , Cho In-Rae , Cohnitz Daniel , Dranseika Vilius , Eraña Lagos Ángeles , Ghadakpour Laleh , Grinberg Maurice , Hashimoto Takaaki , Horowitz Amir , Hristova Evgeniya , Jraissati Yasmina , Kadreva Veselina , Karasawa Kaori , Kim Hackjin , Kim Yeonjeong , Lee Minwoo , Mauro Carlos , Mizumoto Masaharu , Moruzzi Sebastiano , Ornelas Jorge , Osimani Barbara , Romero Carlos , Rosas López Alejandro , Sangoi Massimo , Sereni Andrea , Songhorian Sarah , Struchiner Noel , Tripodi Vera , Usui Naoki , Vázquez del Mercado Alejandro , Vosgerichian Hrag A. , Zhang Xueyi , Zhu Jing TITLE=For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures JOURNAL=Frontiers in Psychology VOLUME=10 YEAR=2019 URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428 DOI=10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428 ISSN=1664-1078 ABSTRACT=

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.