Xi Wang ¹ Tao ZHANG ¹ Hanxiang Gong ^2* Jinghua Li ³ Baoling Wu ¹ Baoxin Chen ⁴ Shufang Zhao ¹

• ¹ Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao, Macau Region, China
• ² The Second Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou, China
• ³ School of Public Health, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou, China
• ⁴ Pingshan General Hospital, Shenzhen, China

With the rapid development of China's pharmaceutical industry, issues of corruption and regulatory effectiveness, and corruption have become increasingly prominent, posing critical challenges to public health safety and the industry's sustainable development. This paper adopts a bounded rationality perspective and employs a game-theoretic evolutionary approach to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model involving pharmaceutical companies, third-party auditing organizations, and health insurance regulatory agencies. It analyzes the stable strategies of the parties involved and the sensitivity of key parameters within this tripartite game system. The study reveals that adherence to health insurance regulations by pharmaceutical companies, refusal of bribes by third-party auditing organizations, and the implementation of lenient regulations by health insurance agencies can form an effective governance equilibrium. This equilibrium state contributes to reducing corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, balancing the interests of all parties, and promoting healthy industry development. Pharmaceutical companies must balance compliance costs against the risks of noncompliance benefits while maximizing profits; third-party auditing organizations need to choose between fulfilling their duties and accepting bribes, considering their economic benefits and professional reputation; health insurance regulatory agencies adjust their strategies between strict and lenient regulation to maximize social welfare. The paper suggests enhancing policy support, strengthening compliance supervision, improving audit independence, and adjusting regulatory strategies to optimize governance in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, the research highlights the role of collaborative efforts among the three parties in achieving sustainable governance.Furthermore, the study conducts a numerical simulation analysis to demonstrate the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary stability of the system, providing practical insights into the implementation of regulatory policies. This research offers new insights for policy issues of governance, 删除[箱子]:formulation and governance in China's pharmaceutical sector, providing significant reference value 37 for guiding the industry's sustainable development.