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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Mar. Sci.

Sec. Marine Affairs and Policy

Volume 12 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fmars.2025.1552136

This article is part of the Research Topic Challenges and Opportunities for Decarbonizing the Maritime Industry View all 5 articles

Research on the Coordination of Marine Green Fuel Supply Chain Considering Costsharing Contract and Revenue-sharing Contract 1

Provisionally accepted
Chang-yan Xu Chang-yan Xu 1Yi-qun Wang Yi-qun Wang 1Di-lin Yao Di-lin Yao 1Si-Yuan Qiu Si-Yuan Qiu 2Hui Li Hui Li 3*
  • 1 Shanghai Maritime University, pudong, Shanghai, China
  • 2 Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Xi‘an, China
  • 3 Guangxi Minzu University, Nanning, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    The marine green fuel supply chain is a crucial component in the development of green ports.Focusing on the issue of cooperative contracts between port and green marine fuel supplier within the marine green fuel supply chain, firstly, a two-echelon marine green fuel supply chain optimization model consisting of a green marine fuel supplier and a port is constructed. Secondly, the changes in profits and decisions of green marine fuel supplier and port are compared under four scenarios: no contract, cost-sharing contract, revenue-sharing contract, and combined revenuesharing + cost-sharing contract. Finally, the propositions are validated using numerical simulation methods. The research findings show that, in terms of revenue, the combined profits of port and green marine fuel supplier under the combined revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract exceed those under the revenue-sharing contract alone. Regarding the sale price of marine green fuel and bunkering service quality, these factors peak under the cost-sharing contract and reach their lowest under the revenue-sharing contract. An increase in the port's investment proportion in marine green fuel bunkering service quality leads to decreases in the bunkering volume, sale price, wholesale price, and bunkering service quality of marine green fuel under both the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing + cost-sharing contract. Additionally, the higher proportion of revenue shared by the port with the green marine fuel supplier results in lower sale price, wholesale price, and bunkering service quality of green marine fuel under both the revenue-sharing contract and revenuesharing + cost-sharing contract.

    Keywords: Green ports, Marine green fuel, Cost-sharing contract, Revenue-sharing contract, Stackelberg game

    Received: 27 Dec 2024; Accepted: 12 Feb 2025.

    Copyright: © 2025 Xu, Wang, Yao, Qiu and Li. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Hui Li, Guangxi Minzu University, Nanning, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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