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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Mar. Sci.
Sec. Marine Affairs and Policy
Volume 12 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fmars.2025.1546146
This article is part of the Research Topic Challenges and Opportunities for Decarbonizing the Maritime Industry View all 3 articles

Emission-Reduction Investment Strategies in Competitive Shipping Supply Chains under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms

Provisionally accepted
Guangsheng Zhang Guangsheng Zhang 1Zhaomin Zhang Zhaomin Zhang 2*Yuan Hao Yuan Hao 2Weijie Chen Weijie Chen 2
  • 1 Shandong Management University, Jinan, China
  • 2 Shenzhen Polytechnic, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    Market-based carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms play a pivotal role in reducing the carbon emissions of shipping logistics companies. Focusing on the issue of emission reduction investment in the competitive shipping logistics service supply chain (SLSSCs) under carbon cap-and-trade, this paper constructs a game theory model for emission reduction investment decision-making in the SLSSC, which comprises two participants-a shipping logistics service provider (SLSP) and a shipping logistics service integrator (SLSI)-discusses the equilibrium strategy of emission reduction investment based on optimization theory, and further explores the benefits of participating entities, consumer surplus, and social welfare under different emission reduction strategies. The findings indicate that: (1) a no-reduction investment strategy, a single-chain investment strategy, and a dual-chain investment strategy can each serve as equilibrium strategies, which are influenced by the interplay among the unit carbon emission trading price, the spillover effect of emission reduction investments, and the associated cost coefficient. (2) Both single-chain and dual-chain emission reduction strategies in the SLSSCs contribute to consumer surplus; however, their impact on social welfare is contingent on the SLSI’s cost coefficient for emission reductionn investments. (3) Under the single-chain equilibrium strategy, the spillover effect from the SLSI’s emission reduction investment has a favorable impact on returns for participants in the non-investing chain, consumer surplus, and social welfare, but adversely affectts returns for participants in the investing chain. Under the dual-chain equilibrium strategy, the spillover effect benefits both chains’ participants’ returns, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, the SLSP’s altruistic inclination enhances participants’ returns, consumer surplus, and social welfare across all strategies.

    Keywords: carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms, competitive shipping logistics service supply chain, emission-reduction investment, Consumer surplus, Social Welfare

    Received: 16 Dec 2024; Accepted: 31 Jan 2025.

    Copyright: © 2025 Zhang, Zhang, Hao and Chen. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Zhaomin Zhang, Shenzhen Polytechnic, Shenzhen, 518055, Guangdong, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.