AUTHOR=Yatziv Tal , Jacobson Hilla 

TITLE=Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders

JOURNAL=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

VOLUME=9

YEAR=2015

URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00204

DOI=10.3389/fnhum.2015.00204

ISSN=1662-5161

ABSTRACT=<p>The paper focuses on the question of what the (visual) perceptual differences are between individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. We argue against the view that autistic subjects have a deficiency in the most basic form of perceptual consciousness—namely, phenomenal consciousness. Instead, we maintain, the perceptual atypicality of individuals with autism is of a more conceptual and cognitive sort—their perceptual experiences share crucial aspects with TD individuals. Our starting point is Ben Shalom’s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">2005</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B10">2009</xref>) three-level processing framework for explaining atypicality in several domains of processing among autistics, which we compare with two other tripartite models of perception—Jackendoff’s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B36">1987</xref>) and Prinz’s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B65">2000</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B67">2005a</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B62">2007</xref>) Intermediate Level Hypothesis and Lamme’s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B41">2004</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B42">2006</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B43">2010</xref>) neural account of consciousness. According to these models, whereas the second level of processing is concerned with viewer-centered visual representations of basic visual properties and incorporates some early forms of integration, the third level is more cognitive and conceptual. We argue that the data suggest that the atypicality in autism is restricted mainly to the third level. More specifically, second-level integration, which is the mark of phenomenal consciousness, is typical, yet third-level integration of perceptual objects and concepts is atypical. Thus, the basic experiences of individuals with autism are likely to be similar to typical subjects’ experiences; the main difference lies in the sort of cognitive access the subjects have to their experiences. We conclude by discussing implications of the suggested analysis of experience in autism for conceptions of phenomenal consciousness.</p>