AUTHOR=Bernacer Javier , Murillo Jose Ignacio TITLE=The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribution to human neuroscience JOURNAL=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience VOLUME=8 YEAR=2014 URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00883 DOI=10.3389/fnhum.2014.00883 ISSN=1662-5161 ABSTRACT=
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that