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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Environ. Sci.
Sec. Environmental Policy and Governance
Volume 12 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fenvs.2024.1491608
This article is part of the Research Topic Advancing Carbon Reduction and Pollution Control Policies Management: Theoretical, Application, and Future Impacts View all 9 articles

Carbon Emission Reduction in China's Iron and Steel Industry through Technological Innovation: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis under Government Subsidies

Provisionally accepted
Tang Xinfa Tang Xinfa 1*Liu Shuai Liu Shuai 1Wang Yonghua Wang Yonghua 2Wan Youwei Wan Youwei 1
  • 1 Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, China
  • 2 State Grid Jiangxi Electric power CO.,LTD, Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    The steel industry is notable for its significant environmental impact, highlighting the pressing need to promote technological innovation within the sector in order to reduce carbon emissions. This paper utilizes a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behaviors of steel producers, construction companies, scrap steel recyclers, and the government throughout the entire steel production, consumption, and recycling processes and their impact on carbon emission reduction. The analysis and simulation of the model provide policy insights for these four key players. The study's findings are as follows: (i) Government subsidies can effectively stimulate low-carbon production methods and encourage green consumer behavior. (ii) The strategic choices for technological innovation by steel manufacturers and scrap steel recyclers are primarily influenced by cost factors. Government subsidies for technological innovation play a crucial role in incentivizing a smooth transition to lowcarbon production methods. (iii) For steel manufacturers, the carbon benefits derived from technological innovation are a critical factor influencing their engagement in such initiatives. If these manufacturers can benefit from environmental regulations, they are more likely to engage in technological innovation. (iv) The strategies of construction companies are influenced by production costs and carbon benefits associated with steel manufacturers, exhibiting threshold effects.

    Keywords: Iron and steel industry, Dual-carbon goals, technological innovation, evolutionary game, Subsidize

    Received: 05 Sep 2024; Accepted: 11 Nov 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 Xinfa, Shuai, Yonghua and Youwei. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: Tang Xinfa, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.