AUTHOR=Hu Zikun , Wang Yina , Liao Wenjun , Tao Tingyu , Zhang Hao TITLE=A study on the evolutionary game theory of third-party governance of environmental pollution based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights JOURNAL=Frontiers in Environmental Science VOLUME=12 YEAR=2024 URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/environmental-science/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1356190 DOI=10.3389/fenvs.2024.1356190 ISSN=2296-665X ABSTRACT=

The third-party governance of environmental pollution and the pollution rights trading system are two typical examples of modern environmental governance systems. In China, the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises is the link through which to achieve synergy between the two factors. To explore how to achieve such synergy, first, the “principle of no-fault liability” is introduced, and the responsibilities of pollution-discharging enterprises and pollution-control enterprises are defined. Second, based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights, a revenue-sharing mechanism for pollution rights trading is designed. Finally, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of pollution-discharging enterprises, pollution-control enterprises and local governments is constructed, and numerical simulation is performed. The results are as follows. 1) By setting a reasonable market trading price for pollution rights, a reward and punishment distribution coefficient, an improvement in reputation gains, and a saving in pollution rights indicators become conducive to the formation of cooperative relationships between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises, for which the reasonable range of the reward and punishment distribution coefficient is (0.3, 0.4]. 2) Regardless of whether a government subsidy is provided, the optimal range of the revenue-sharing coefficient from pollution rights trading is [0.5, 0.6]. 3) When a government subsidy is withdrawn, increasing the market trading price and surplus indicators of pollution rights can promote the stable operation of the third-party governance model. 4) An increase in policy support and administrative accountability of higher levels of government and a reduction in supervision costs for local governments can help these parties effectively avoid addressing the absence of local government supervision. It is recommended that third-party governance enterprises participate in pollution rights trading to implement the main responsibilities of pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises and to set a reasonable revenue-sharing coefficient and reward and punishment distribution coefficient of pollution rights.