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ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Energy Res.
Sec. Energy Storage
Volume 12 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fenrg.2024.1442194
This article is part of the Research Topic Optimization and Data-driven Approaches for Energy Storage-based Demand Response to Achieve Power System Flexibility View all 19 articles

Research on Time-of-Use Compensation Pricing Strategies for Load Aggregators Based on User Demand Response

Provisionally accepted
YANG Hongzhao YANG Hongzhao 1*Zhang Zhan Zhang Zhan 1Liang Rui Liang Rui 2Zhao Weifeng Zhao Weifeng 3
  • 1 School of Software, Changsha Social Work College, Changsha, China
  • 2 School of Electrical and Information Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Anhui Province, China
  • 3 College of Electrical and Information Engineering,, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan Province, China

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

    As the electric power market reform deepens, the strategic role of load aggregators in demand-side response becomes increasingly important. The inherent variability of distributed renewable energy generation and user demand response often leads to a mismatch between the purchased electricity and the market bid volume, resulting in punitive costs for companies. To address this issue, this study treats demand-side controllable loads as dispatchable resources and proposes a tiered pricing strategy to adjust power distribution. By establishing a Stackelberg leader-follower game model, the study promotes a mutually beneficial relationship between load aggregators and controllable load users. Through case studies, this paper examines the operational profits of load aggregators and the power adjustment behaviors of controllable load users under tiered and fixed compensation pricing schemes. The results indicate that tiered compensation pricing significantly reduces punitive costs and enhances user participation in demand response.

    Keywords: load aggregators, controllable load management, Tiered Compensation Strategies, Stackelberg game theory, demand-side response

    Received: 14 Jun 2024; Accepted: 26 Aug 2024.

    Copyright: © 2024 Hongzhao, Zhan, Rui and Weifeng. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

    * Correspondence: YANG Hongzhao, School of Software, Changsha Social Work College, Changsha, China

    Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.