An intense debate has been on-going about how artificial intelligence (AI) technology investments have an impact on employment. The debate has often focused on the potential of AI for human task automation, omitting the strategic incentive for firms to cooperate with their workers as to exploit AI technologies for the most relevant benefit of new product and service innovation.
We calibrate an empirical probit regression model of how changes in employment relate to AI diffusion, based on formalizing a game-theoretical model of a firm exploiting the twin role of AI innovation and AI automation for both absolute and competitive advantage.
The theoretical game-theory prediction is that employment following AI technology adoption is not negative, and ultimately depends on how AI leads to new success in innovation, competition which defines the competitive reward of innovation and profit sharing between workers and firms. Our estimation, is based on a global survey of 3,000 large companies across 10 countries, demonstrates that a firm employment growth depends on two strategic postures, that is, the firm relative maturity of AI adoption as well as its relative bias toward AI-based product innovation.
The contribution of this research is to highlight the twin role of firm and workers in shaping how technology will affect employment. AI in particular marries the potential of task automation with even more potential for expansion.