AUTHOR=Fall Abdou Khadre Dit Jadir 

TITLE=Modeling the political choice of public health insurance

JOURNAL=Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics

VOLUME=Volume 9 - 2023

YEAR=2023

URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/applied-mathematics-and-statistics/articles/10.3389/fams.2023.961158

DOI=10.3389/fams.2023.961158

ISSN=2297-4687

ABSTRACT=This paper studies the choice between two health insurance systems in a monopolistic scheme. The first proposes a uniform contribution level and the second proposes a contribution proportional to the probability of getting sick. Individuals differ by their number, income, contribution and risk. Two kinds of voting models using welfare function are used; a direct vote which involves a size effect and a probabilistic vote which involves a bias in favor of one system Results, according to theorical models, indicate that a uniform contribution level is adopted by high-risk individuals and also if wealth and illness are strongly negatively correlated. However, when wealth and illness are not correlated or poorly correlated, a contribution proportional to the probability of getting sick system is adopted. These results are explained by the fact that the loss of well-being for  low-income and sick people is more important.